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Abstract
Redundant electronic systems confront us with new chal-
lenges in reliability analysis since handling and defining their
back-up strategies is not a straightforward task by means of
using qualitative approaches. This paper presents a technique
through reliability theory, which enables the designer organiz-
ing functions and logical relationship between failures from the
system level up to the last component.
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1 Introduction
Reliability is a feature incorporated into a heavy goods ve-
hicle in the course of the design process that is realized in the
course of production by a high degree of technological disci-
pline, and maintained in exploitation by continual and stipulated
maintenance and orderly usage. In designing reliability, it is
necessary to predict or estimate the reliability of each vehicle
system element, as far as technically accomplishable [1].
2 Functional Reliability Analysis of Brake Systems
2.1 Qualitative Safety Requirements according to Related
Standards
The Functional Safety standard IEC 61508 sets out require-
ments for electrical/electronic and programmable electronic
(E/E/PES) systems. A system is said to be safety-related if any
failure to function can present a prospect of harm to people.
SILs (Safety Integrity Levels) are used by IEC 61508 to char-
acterize the required functional safety of computer control sys-
tems. SIL is a measure of the probability that the safety-related
system may fail in a dangerous manner. The value of SIL ranges
from 1 (the lowest) to 4 (the highest). For example, SIL 4, the
highest rating is for fly-by-wire aircraft and weapons systems
and track circuited train signalling systems while SIL 2 is typi-
cal of certain Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). SILs are
shown in Table 1, from IEC 61508:
The safety functions necessary to ensure the required func-
tional safety for each determined hazard shall be specified. This
shall constitute the specification for the overall safety functions
requirements. The necessary risk reduction shall be determined
for each determined hazardous event. The necessary risk re-
duction may be determined in a quantitative and/or qualitative
manner. For situations when an application sector international
standard exists which includes appropriate methods for directly
determining the necessary risk reduction, then such standards
may be used to meet the requirement of this sub clause. The
safety integrity requirements, in terms of the necessary risk re-
duction, shall be specified for each safety function.
In determining a SIL, parts 1 and 5 of IEC 61508 take a hazard
and risk based approach with progressive refinement [2].
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Tab. 1. SIL levels [2]
Safety integrity level (SIL) Low demand mode of operation
(Average probability of failure to
perform its designed function on
demand)
High demand or continuous mode
of operation (Probability of a dan-
gerous failure per hour)
4 ≤ 10−5 to < 10−4 ≤ 10−9 to < 10−8
3 ≤ 10−4 to < 10−3 ≤ 10−8 to < 10−7
2 ≤ 10−3 to < 10−2 ≤ 10−7 to < 10−6
1 ≤ 10−2 to < 10−1 ≤ 10−6 to < 10−5
Fig. 1. Established Risk Graph (IEC 1 666/98)
Fig. 2. FTA extract of a redundant electronic brake system with OR gates and basic events
2.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment
The risk graph method is a qualitative method that enables
safety integrity level of a safety-related system to be determined
from knowledge of the factors associated with the EUC (Equip-
ment Under Control) and the EUC control system.
Where a qualitative approach is adopted, in order to simplify
matters a number of parameters are introduced which together
describe the nature of the hazardous situation when safety-
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related systems fail or are not available. One parameter is cho-
sen from each of the four sets, and then the selected parameters
are combined to decide the safety integrity level allocated to the
safety-related systems. These parameters allow a meaningful
graduation of the risks to be made and contain the key risk as-
sessment factors.
The following simplified procedure is based on the following
equation: R = f · C , where:
• R is the risk with no safely-related systems in place,
• f is the frequency of the hazardous event with no safety-
related systems in place,
• C is the consequence of the hazardous event (the conse-
quences could be related to harm associated with health and
safety or harm from environmental damage).
The frequency of the hazardous event f is, in this case, con-
sidered to be made up of three influencing factors:
• frequency of and exposure time in the hazardous zone;
• the possibility of avoiding the hazardous event;
• the probability of the hazardous event taking place without
the addition of any safety-related systems (but having in place
external risk reduction facilities) – this is termed by the prob-
ability of the unwanted occurrence.
This produces the following four risk parameters:
• consequence of the hazardous event (C),
• frequency of and exposure time in the hazardous zone (F), –
possibility of failing to avoid the hazardous event (P),
• probability of the unwanted occurrence (W ).
By using the qualitative method depicted in Fig. 1 and de-
scribed earlier in the part of the paper, a detailed safety analysis
of the relevant electronic brake system functions has been elab-
orated.
Table 2 lists the most important state-of-the-art functions of
an EBS used in commercial vehicles in all heavy trucks in
Europe since 1996. The basis for the analysis is the Regula-
tion UN/ECE 13, which defines that an appropriate deceleration
must be provided under all conditions even if there is a single
failure in the service braking system. The redundancy must be
assured on the way which provides controllable deceleration on
prescribed level. This means if the control and the actuation of
the foundation brakes need different kinds of energy the redun-
dancy must be ensured in case of both one.
As a consequence, deceleration (i.e. the braking ability) as a
function is only ranked as SIL 3. ‘Surprisingly’ the brake as-
sistant function obtained ranking SIL 2, and the other important
functions, such as ABS and ESP only SIL level 1. Even if these
two latter functionalities have very high impact on the accident
probability and their severity, their availability is not essential
Tab. 2. Assessment of electronic brake functions
Functions SIL level 4 3 2 1 0
Deceleration (braking) SIL 3 ♦
ISC – adhesion and wear control SIL 1 ♦
ISC – coupling force control SIL 1 ♦
Brake assistant SIL 2 ♦
Tilt prevention SIL 0 ♦
ABS SIL 1 ♦
ATC (Automatic Traction Control) / SIL 0 ♦
DTC (Drag Torque Control)
ESP SIL 1 ♦
Differential control SIL 0 ♦
Hill brake SIL 0 ♦
Trailer brake SIL 0 ♦
from the deceleration viewpoint (this is the reason that they have
‘fail-silent’ nature, i.e. in case of a failure they will be securely
disabled). All the other functions (tilt prevention, ATC, DTC,
hill brake) are SIL level 0, which is understandable in the light
of the above analyses. The level 0 ranking of the trailer brake
system, however, requires a short explanation. The engineering
feeling says that the trailer brake is a significant component in
providing the required deceleration for the combination. This
is true, however, the regulation does not consider the combi-
nation, but only individual vehicles, and thus the motor vehi-
cle brake performance does not depend on the existence of the
trailer brake system. This last example shows that the results of
such qualitative analyses have to be carefully analysed and the
right conclusion has to be drawn.
2.3 Quantitative Approach
The FTA creates a fault model, and contains the analysis of
the model. The fault tree is built from top to down (Fig. ??), it
is a deductive procedure. Fault trees provide a convenient sym-
bolic representation of the combination of the events resulting in
the occurrence of the top event. The FTA provides a statement
on the total failure risk. For the analysis of failure combinations
FTA is more appropriate than FMEA.
The starting-point is always a system-level problem, the top
event. The goal of the modelling is to find the basic cause(s)
of the predetermined problem. These causes are called basic
events. The relations between the basic events must be accu-
rately specified. This influences fundamentally the final result
of calculation. On easy fault tree construction behalf we could
define intermediate events. This type of events is composed of
basic events. During the analysis the occurrence of the interme-
diate events is counted from the failure rates of the basic events.
The functional failures or malfunctions at the outputs of the sys-
tem are caused by logical combinations of the failure rates of the
events. Some possible relations are enumerated below:
AND: It indicates that the output occurs if and only if all of
the input events occur. The output of an AND gate can be
the top event or any intermediate event. The input events can
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be basic events, intermediate events (outputs of other gates),
or a combination of both. There should be at least two input
events to an AND gate.
OR: It indicates that the output occurs if and only if at least
one of the input events occurs. The output of an OR gate can
be the top event or any intermediate event. The input events
can be basic events, intermediate events, or a combination of
both. There should be at least two inputs to an OR gate.
K/N: The Voting gate indicates that the output occurs if and
only if K out of the N input events occurs [3]. The N in-
put events need not occur simultaneously. The output occurs
when at least K input events occur. When K = 1, the Voting
gate behaves like an OR gate. The output of a Voting gate can
be a top event or an intermediate event. The input events can
be basic events, intermediate events, or combinations of both.
It should be remarked that this analysis does not necessarily
depend upon credible component failure rates to produce useful
results. In the case of software modules, or components with no
sufficient history of use, such failure rates would be impossible
or very difficult to obtain anyway. However, the logical reduc-
tion of fault trees into minimal cut-sets can still indicate single
points of failure in the system and point out potential design
weaknesses that may lead to useful design iterations.
In the terminology of fault trees, a cut-set is a set of basic
events (i.e. leaf nodes of the tree or component failures) that if
they occur causes the top event of the tree (system failure). A
cut-set is called “minimal” if there is no sub-set of events in that
set that is also a cut-set, i.e. if there are no redundant events in
the set.
3 Conclusions
Nowadays during analysing more and more mainly electron-
ically complex automotive systems, the question of the most
suitable reliability analysis method has arisen. In this paper
two accepted techniques were presented giving hints to a well-
structured system analysis. Depending on the aim of the analysis
the right reliability analysis tool has to be chosen or in case of
complex analysis, more tools should be used at one time sup-
porting each other.
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